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Abstract. The current technological scenario determines a profilera-
tion of trust domains, which are usually defined by validating the digital
identity linked to each user. This validation entails critical assumptions
about the way users’ privacy is handled, and this calls for new meth-
ods to construct and treat digital identities. Considering cryptography,
identity management has been constructed and managed through con-
ventional digital signatures. Nowadays, new types of digital signatures
are required, and this transition should be guided by rigorous evaluation
of the theoretical basis, but also by the selection of properly verified soft-
ware means. This latter point is the core of this paper. We analyse the
main non-conventional digital signatures that could endorse an adequate
tradeoff betweeen security and privacy. This discussion is focused on
practical software solutions that are already implemented and available
online. The goal is to help security system designers to discern identity
management functionalities through standard cryptographic software li-
braries.
1 Introduction
Identity management is one of the most challenging matters in communication
networks. Although it is possible to reach a conclusion about physical identity,
it is not so easy to establish a relationship between a physical identity and a
digital identity. Cryptography provides a means to associate a digital identity
to an user on the grounds of asymmetric cryptography. In this guise, a pair of
keys (the public and the private keys) are generated such that each component
of this pair is connected to the other, but it is not computationally possible
to use one of them to obtain the other. If one uses her private key, then the
encrypted information can be only decrypted by means of the related public key.
Correspondingly, if an user sends a (hashed) message and the message encrypted
with her private key, the previous procedure leads to a verification of both the
integrity of the message and the correctness of the private key. Loosely speaking,
this procedure depicts the way the basic digital signatures are generated. Digital
signatures are publicly verifiable and transferable cryptographic primitives, and
they also have the property of non-repudiation [33, Chapter 1]. These are the
main properties of what we can call conventional digital signatures.
The combination of non-repudiation and transferability are not always re-
quired and they are even replaced by a deniability commitment. For example,
this is the case of scenarios as e-voting and e-coin where a user is interested on
proving the authenticity of a piece of information to a certain receiver, but she
wants to prevent the sender from proving this fact to other parties. Besides, in
other situations it is demanded to design a signature scheme where a message or
a document can be signed by multiple users (for example, if we are dealing with
a committee that has to endorse as a whole a document). As it is underlined in
[12], there are more than 60 digital signatures models. The classification of those
models is not an easy task, since the discern between the underlying properties
is far from a straightforward operation. Regarding the implementation of the
different digital signatures models, this fact incorporates an additional risk. Cer-
tainly, one of the major problems in the design of security software is drawn by
non-complete description of basic assumptions and their implications in concrete
application contexts. This task should be based on the identification of standard
products offering the functionalities that our design demands [19]. Indeed, soft-
ware standards are products that have been carefully evaluated, which implies
that we can assume a reasonable certainty about their reliability.
In this paper we review the most relevant families of non-conventional digital
signatures, being the core of our effort to identify software libraries sustaining
each one of the considered schemes. We discuss the main properties and appli-
cations of the considered digital signatures. In some cases we show that there
does not exist well-founded and properly evaluated software libraries. However,
it is possible to establish a set of basic cryptographic primitives and software
libraries as a means to finally implement the referred digital signatures.
2 Group signatures
Group signatures allow members of a group of signers to issue signatures on
behalf of the group that can be verified without telling which specific member
issued it [15]. These schemes typically include a group manager (GM ) responsible
for setting up the group and, sometimes, managing it. The main functionality is
issuing signatures (sign) and verify ing them. Additionally, GM can open a group
signature to retrieve the identity of its issuer. These schemes endow users with
anonymous authentication and unlinkability. However, there are also schemes to
enable signatures linkability [47] or traceability [34]. It is also possible to revoke a
member’s private key, preventing her to issue new signatures. This may be done
by publishing the trapdoor used for open, publishing the trapdoor used as trace,
or just enabling an authority for answering this kind of status requests. Some
schemes modify this basic scenario, by dividing GM in multiple authorities for
the tasks related to managing the group [6]; or add new authorities for performing
other delicate tasks, like tracing revoked group members [34].
Group signatures provide an anonymity degree proportional to the group size.
Thus, they are typically used for privacy-respectful authentication in anonymous
certificates [5], e-voting [47], e-cash [38], and anonymous attestation [10].
Standards and implementations. Group signatures have been standardised
by the ISO/IEC [29] (general setting and main operations) and [30] (which de-
fines a total of 7 schemes with opening and linking capabilities). In [5,20] ex-
tended X.509 certificates are used to manage digital identities based on group
signatures. Several implementations of group signature schemes are currently
available online. [8] is implemented in C within the PBC_sig library1 and using
Python within the Charm framework2 [3]; [6] is implemented in C in the FTMGS
library3; [11] and [4] are implemented in the libgs library using Java, as part
of the PP2db project4; and the extensible libgroupsig C library5 implements
[8], [34] and [16], and allows the addition of new group signature schemes.
3 Ring signatures
As an alternative to group signatures, ring signatures can be considered to have
a more flexible solution where anonymity revocation is not possible. Ring sig-
natures were first introduced in [42], and further contributions incorporate ad-
ditional controls on the original proposal. Thus, in some specific contexts it is
necessary to determine whether two signatures have been created by the same
group member, which is addressed by the so-called linkable ring signatures [37].
In other situations it is convenient to adopt traceable ring signatures to trace the
origin of two signatures with respect to the same metainformation or tag [22].
The main difference between group and ring signatures is given by the initial
setup and the possibility of conforming ad hoc groups. Ring signatures are not
ruled by a central authority and there is no need for an initial setup. Moreover,
if one adheres to ring signatures, then groups can be generated without an extra
cost derived from re-organization (i.e., a new setup to include the new members
of the group). This characteristic is of major importance to tackle non-closed
groups in e-cash, e-voting, and e-token systems [47]. In fact, here we have to
acknowledge the efforts from the bitcoin-related community. Ring signatures are
key components of P2P electronic cash infrastructures where the existence of a
trusted central authority cannot be taken for granted. Privacy preserving social
networks also demand procedures to validate a piece of information as originated
by a certain group and to avoid identity forgery attacks (as sockpuppetry or sybil
attacks), and correspondingly there are some recent proposals applying linkable
ring signatures for such a goal [39].
Standards and implementations. Along with group signatures, ring signa-
tures are one of the cryptographic means to manage users’ anonymity. This being
the case, the most relevant standard for ring signatures is given by [29] and [30].
Regarding software implementation of ring signatures, we have to underline the
1 http://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/sig/.
2 https://code.google.com/p/charm-crypto/.
3 http://www.lcc.uma.es/~vicente/swprj/index.html#libftmgs.
4 http://www.ing.unibs.it/ntw/tools/pp2db/.
5 https://bitbucket.org/jdiazvico/libgroupsig.
variant of [23] provided in cryptonote’s library6, the inclusion of a Python ver-
sion of [17] in Charm, the C implementation given in the PBC library for [49],
and the software counterpart of [36] in the Crypto-book prototype 7.
4 Blind signatures
A blind signature scheme allows a user U to obtain a signature from a signer
S over any arbitrary message m, but without S learning anything about m
[14]. There are variants of this basic behavior, like partially blind signatures [1],
allowing to include a message known by both signer and user; restrictive blind
signatures [9], which only allow the issuance of a blind signature for messages
that comply certain rules; finally, in fair blind signatures [45] an authority has
privileged information allowing the signer to link message and signature pairs.
Usually, a blind signing protocol is a three step process. First, during the blinding
step, the user blinds the message to be signed with the help of a random value.
This blinded value is then sent to the signer, who performs some verifications
upon it, signs the blinded message and sends the result to the user. Finally,
the user generates the final signature applying the random value used to blind
the message to unblinds the received token. Blind signatures offer a distinction
between authentication and token assignment, which is of major importance for
creating privacy respectful protocols, like e-cash [32] and e-voting [35].
Standards and implementations For blind signatures, there is currently an
undergoing effort by the ISO/IEC to standardise the general setting, entities
and processes [27], along with the discrete logarithm based mechanisms [28].
As for available implementations, the Bouncy Castle Java library8 includes the
class RSABlindingEngine for [14] blind signatures. Many current systems use
the basic variant of blind signatures (like OpenCoin9) and, since it is quite simple
to program given a working RSA implementation, there seems to be a lack of
independent open source libraries. There also does not seem to exist open source
implementations of any of the derivatives of blind signatures.
5 Multi and aggregate signatures
In a multisignature n signers create a signature over a message m, such that it is
possible to verify that all of them have participated in the signing process [31].
While one naive way for achieving this will be to have each signer attach her
conventional signature (e.g., using RSA), this has the drawback of producing
multisignatures that are of linear size in the number of participants and with
linear verification time (also depending on the participants). In a multisignature
scheme there are n signing steps (one for each signer), and a verification process,
which is run independently of the number of signers.
6 https://github.com/AlbertWerner/cryptonotecoin.
7 https://github.com/jyale/crypto-book/.
8 https://www.bouncycastle.org/.
9 http://opencoin.org/.
Standards and implementations. [24] highlights that the ISO/IEC 14888-2
standard [26] can be used to build identity-based multisignatures. Besides, naive
multisignatures can be implemented using conventional digital signatures.
6 Threshold signatures
In these schemes, at least t signers out of n need to collaborate in order to
produce a valid signature, composing what is called a (t, n)-threshold signature
scheme [18]. Group signatures and multisignatures can be seen as (1, n) and (n, n)
threshold signature schemes, respectively. Besides signers and verifiers, it is also
frequent to find a special entity, the combiner, who gathers all the shares and
joins them to produce the final signature. Therefore, the processes in a threshold
signature scheme are: a signing algorithm through which each of the signers
produces a signature share; a combination process (which may be performed by
the signers, verifier, or by the combiner), which merges all the available shares
(that must be at least t in a (t, n) scheme); and the verify algorithm, determining
whether the signature produced after combining the shares is valid.
Standards and implementations. threshsig10 implements [44] in Java, and
Threshold_ECDSA11 implemented in Java an ECDSA based threshold scheme,
although it does not seem to be available at present. Finally, Bitcoin uses a
simple approach for threshold signatures for contract signing12.
7 Proxy signatures
Proxy signatures allow a user U1 (the delegatee) to sign a message on behalf
of another user U2 (the delegator), if a trusted proxy cooperates [40]. Proxy
re-signatures [7] allow a proxy to convert a valid signature by U1 over a given
message into a valid signature by U2 over the same message. In proxy signature
and proxy re-signature schemes, there are delegators, delegatees and a proxy re-
quired to convert signatures. The proxy and the delegatee must run two separate
processes psign and dsign, respectively, in order to produce the final signature on
behalf of the delegator. In proxy re-signatures, the equivalent to these two pro-
cesses is named resign, and it is executed by the proxy. Also, the function rekey
creates the necessary keys for the proxy to be able to perform the transformation.
The main application of proxy signatures is on delegating signing capabilities.
In [25] proxy re-signatures are also proposed for authenticated routing.
10 https://code.google.com/p/threshsig. As a work of an undergraduate student,
however, it is no longer maintained. See http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/
cryptography/2013-November/018674.html
11 http://nssl.eew.technion.ac.il/files/Projects/Threshold_ECDSA/html/doc/
ECDssSignature.html.
12 https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Contracts. In Bitcoinmultisig transactions are spec-
ified through the CHECKMULTISIGVERIFY opcode and demand n valid signatures out
of m for a transaction to be aproved. This is actually an approach for threshold
signatures, although it requires n separate signatures (instead of just one).
Standards and implementations. While we have found publications report-
ing analysis on implementation of specific schemes (like [46], but which does not
make the code available), we have not been able to locate either standards or
implementations worth mentioning for this primitive.
8 Signatures of knowledge
A conventional digital signature proves a statement of the form “The issuer of
this signature, with public key PK, knows the corresponding private key SK”.
Signatures of knowledge extend this, allowing to issue digital signatures prov-
ing knowledge of witnesses for any NP statement [13]. Specifically, for any NP
language L, given a statement x ∈ L and a witness w proving it, a signature
of knowledge provides a signing algorithm σ = sign(m,w, x, L) which creates a
signature σ of m over x ∈ L, that can be read as “Someone knowing a witness
to x ∈ L is sending the message m”. This can be verified with the verification
counterpart algorithm verify(σ,m, x, L). Signatures of knowledge allow creat-
ing privacy respectful signatures, since there is no need to leak any additional
information besides the knowledge of some fact. In turn, this enables important
functionalities demanded, for example, to implement delegate credentials.
Standards and implementations. There are no standards for this primitive.
Additionally, we have not been able to find direct implementations either. How-
ever, it is worth noting that signatures of knowledge can be easily constructed
from Zero-Knowledge proof systems using the technique explained in [21] (this
is usually called Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge proofs, or NIZK proofs).
9 Identity-based signatures
Identity-based signatures eliminate the need of distributing public keys, allowing
the verification of digital signatures just from the identity that the signer claims
to own [43]. For this, initial schemes relied on a trusted Private Key Generators
(PKG), which are basically trusted entities generating the private keys used for
signing that produce public key independence. However, recent proposals have
reduced the trust placed in this entity, by allowing the detection of dishonest ac-
tions on its behalf (thus, addressing the key escrow problem) [48]. Identity-based
signature schemes include signing and verifying processes, the latter requiring
the identity of the signer instead of her public key. Additionally, the mentioned
schemes reducing the trust in the PKG add another process for checking if the
signature has been generated by a dishonest PKG.
Standards an implementations. in [24] it is highlighted that the standard
ISO/IEC 14888-2 [26] can be applied to derive identity-based multisignatures.
Concerning implementations, there is an implementation of the [41] scheme in the
JPBC library13 and implementations of several schemes in Cayrel’s website14.
13 http://gas.dia.unisa.it/projects/jpbc/schemes/ibs_ps06.html.
14 http://cayrel.net/?Implementation-of-code-based-zero.
10 Conclusion
The laws of identity have a plethora of implications in its general scope, but
even more in the specific context of the digital realm. Along this paper we have
distinguished some of the most relevant properties of digital identities in today
communication networks. We have conducted a survey to expose some important
contributions both from the theoretical and practical point of view. In Table
1 we show a summary of the standards and implementations cited along this
paper. This list in some cases leads to highlight the lack of software proposals
and/or formal standards. We hypothesise that the lack of implementations may
be due to the fact that system designers (usually computer science engineers, not
cryptographers) are not typically aware of these new digital signature schemes.
Consequently, system designers resort to conventional methods to implement the
required functionality, creating a circular dependency that could be problematic
unless those conventional primitives are efficiently implemented and rigorously
tested.
However, since the transition from formal definition of cryptographic prim-
itives to cryptography engineering should be done through a rigorous evalua-
tion process, standardisation is not an option but a commitment. Consequently,
we should claim the absence of software libraries for certain digital signatures
schemes as a call and an urging. This need should be guided by a rigorous evalua-
tion process on the grounds of formal and computational models, but also taking
as bottom line basic cryptographic libraries validated by the cryptographic com-
munity and broadly accepted. This is the case of GMP15, MIRACL16, Cryp-
topp17, and Ben Lynn’s library for Pairing Based Cryptography18. These li-
braries contain the most fundamentals symmetric and asymmetric cryptosys-
tems, but there also exist libraries providing implementations of Zero-Knowledge
proofs19, crytographic commitments20 and Oblivious Transfers21. Finally, it is
necessary to comment on current efforts to adequate digital signatures to low
computational-power environments. Certainly, before incorporating any crypto-
graphic library we should realised a performance study using benchmarks in the
vein of [2]. Here, it is relevant the NaCL library22, since it contains some impor-
tant lightweight digital signatures implementations for ARM architectures.
15 https://gmplib.org/.
16 http://docs.certivox.com/docs/miracl.
17 http://www.cryptopp.com/.
18 http://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/.
19 https://www.peloba.de/index.php/zk-library/?lang=en
20 git://git-crysp.uwaterloo.ca/polycommit, http://scapi.readthedocs.org/.
21 https://github.com/JHUISI/charm/releases.
22 http://nacl.cr.yp.to/.
Signature type Standardization efforts Implementations
Group signatures [29,30,5,20] Extensible libraries
Ring signatures [29,30,5] Specific schemes
Blind signatures [27,28] Specific schemes
Multi signatures [26] (related) Unknown
Threshold signatures Unknown Specific schemes
Proxy signatures Unknown Unknown
Signatures of knowledge Unknown Unknown
Identity-based signatures [26] (related) Specific schemes
Table 1: Reviewed signature types and related standards and implementations.
If there are standards or implementations that we have not located/referenced,
please contact us.
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